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The study indicates 
that default risks are 
on average 32 percent 
lower in energy-
efficient homes, 
controlling for other 
loan determinants.
Executive Summary
In recent years, home energy efficiency has progressed 
from the margins to the mainstream. Builders large and 
small are now constructing homes to higher energy 
efficiency levels. Increasingly, remodeling projects include 
energy efficiency upgrades. Most importantly, consumer 
awareness and acceptance are high. Consumers understand 
that energy efficiency pays for itself over the lifetime of the 
building through lower heating and cooling costs.
Despite these trends, the market has not reached its full 
potential. Financing obstacles prevent 
many moderate- and middle-income 
homebuyers and owners from enjoying 
the benefits of energy efficiency.  An 
important way to encourage greater 
adoption of residential energy efficiency 
measures is for mortgage pricing or 
underwriting flexibility to reflect the 
savings that come as a result of energy 
efficiency. Lenders and investors have 
been reluctant to do so, in part because 
they lack reliable loan performance data 
on which to base underwriting decisions. 
Many have theorized that energy-
efficient homes should have lower default 
risks than standard homes because the 
former are associated with lower energy 
costs, which leaves more money to make 
the mortgage payment. However, few empirical studies have 
been conducted due to limited data availability. 
This study examines actual loan performance data 
obtained from CoreLogic, the lending industry’s leading 
source of such data. To assess whether residential energy 
efficiency is associated with lower default and prepayment 
risks, a national sample of about 71,000 ENERGY STAR- 
and non-ENERGY STAR-rated single-family home 
mortgages was carefully constructed, accounting for loan, 
household, and neighborhood characteristics.
The study finds that default risks are on average 32 
percent lower in energy-efficient homes, controlling for 
other loan determinants. This finding is robust, significant, 
and consistent across several model specifications. A 
borrower in an ENERGY STAR residence is also 
one-quarter less likely to prepay the mortgage. Within 
ENERGY STAR-rated homes, default risk is lower for 
more energy-efficient homes. The lower risks associated 
with energy efficiency should be taken into consideration 
when underwriting mortgages.
Financing Energy Efficiency
Making homes energy efficient often requires higher 
upfront costs, but financing mechanisms can help offset 
them. Investments in residential efficiency often produce 
rates of return well above interest rates or other investment 
opportunities. Still, market failures, such 
as transaction costs and information 
asymmetries, prevent rapid and 
widespread adoption of energy efficiency. 
To succeed, public- and private-sector 
efficiency programs must overcome these 
barriers.
The U.S. housing stock is valued 
at about $14.5 trillion, according to 
the Federal Reserve System. Even 
2% devoted to energy efficiency 
improvements would require capital 
outlays of nearly $300 billion. That 
amount exceeds any funding we could 
realistically expect from the government 
or utility sector.  A variety of funding 
mechanisms exist today, such as, state and 
local energy efficiency loan funds, on-bill 
repayment, and PACE bonds. But their scale is vastly lower 
than what is required. 
By far, the most widely used mechanism is direct 
borrowing.  Most energy improvements for existing homes 
can be financed through consumer loans, a home equity 
loan secured by property, or a traditional or specialized 
mortgage. Such financing usually requires that consumers 
have substantial equity in their existing homes, the financial 
reserves to pay any added costs out-of-pocket, or larger 
down payments for a home purchase. For many first-time 
homebuyers and moderate-income borrowers who do not 
have these financial resources, energy-efficient mortgages 
(EEM) offer a solution. EEMs offer lenders flexibility in the 
debt-to-income and other underwriting considerations so 
that borrowers can qualify for larger loans or lower interest 
rates.
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An important way 
to encourage greater 
adoption of residential 
energy efficiency 
measures is for 
mortgage pricing or 
underwriting flexibility 
to reflect the savings 
that come as a result of 
energy efficiency.
 Conceptually, EEMs and other mortgage-based 
products present a number of advantages as energy 
efficiency financing tools, since they allow consumers to 
finance efficiency features at mortgage rates, as opposed 
to high commercial credit rates. However, these products 
have received little market uptake to date, largely because 
of the transactional complexity, poorly developed lender 
guidance, limited benefits for lenders, and lack of consumer 
information. Few lenders currently offer them except 
for Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and Veterans 
Administration mortgages, even in states with the largest 
numbers of new ENERGY STAR 
homes.   
The limited availability of EEMs 
may be due in large part to the 
market’s tighter mortgage qualification 
rules, which do not recognize 
energy efficiency, as well as a lack of 
information about their default risks. 
If, indeed, mortgages on energy-
efficient homes have lower risks than 
those on less efficient homes, then 
good credit policy would merit more 
flexible underwriting standards or 
even consideration in loan-level price 
adjustments. In addition, with more 
accurate information on risks, lenders 
may be able to develop and tailor 
mortgage products that better meet the 
needs of both consumers and investors.  
Policy Implications
Because the findings are consistent across different 
model specifications and types of subsamples, we can derive 
a number of implications for policy and lending practices. 
First, lenders may want to require information about 
energy costs and encourage an energy audit or energy 
rating during the process of mortgage underwriting. In 
the same manner that appraisals calculate the value of the 
home, an energy-rating determination could inform other 
important characteristics of the loan, including the debt-to-
income ratio. Utilizing energy audits as part of the mortgage 
underwriting process would help homeowners make 
informed decisions about energy efficiency investments and 
likely promote long-term efficiency of the housing stock. 
Second, lenders and secondary market investors should 
take into account the energy efficiency of the home used 
as collateral for the loan in an underwriting decision. For 
instance, they may allow for a higher debt-to-income ratio 
and a higher appraisal value to offset the modest increase in 
cost-of-energy improvements. This and similar approaches 
would allow borrowers to obtain the underwriting 
flexibility needed to cover the modest additional cost of 
energy efficiency features and increase affordability for 
many moderate- and middle-income borrowers. 
In summary, the findings 
demonstrate that energy efficiency 
and the degree of energy efficiency 
matter. The lower risks associated with 
energy efficiency should be taken into 
consideration when underwriting 
mortgage risks. Major market 
stakeholders, such as FHA, Freddie 
Mac, and Fannie Mae, could encourage 
underwriting flexibility for mortgages 
on energy-efficient homes as well as 
promote energy efficiency to consumers 
in concert with their lending partners. 
Finally, Congress should consider the 
findings in its deliberations of current 
and proposed legislation to improve 
the accuracy of mortgage underwriting 
used by federal mortgage agencies, 
by ensuring that energy costs are 
considered in the underwriting process. 
Roberto Quercia
UNC Center for Community Capital
Department of City and Regional Planning
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Robert Sahadi
Institute for Market Transformation 
Sarah Stellberg 
Institute for Market Transformation
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Introduction
Over the last few decades, even while houses are 
becoming more energy efficient, energy costs per household 
and the total energy used in the residential sector are rising. 
Many people are living in smaller households but in larger 
houses, with increasing reliance on space conditioning and 
appliances, which result in higher energy consumption per 
household (Kaza 2010). In turn, higher energy costs leave 
households with less income to meet other needs, such 
as housing-related expenses. If these trends are going to 
change anytime soon, greater adoption of energy efficiency 
measures is needed.  An important way to encourage such 
adoption is for mortgage pricing or underwriting flexibility 
to reflect the savings that come as a result of energy 
efficiency. Keoleian et al. (2000) argue that while an energy-
efficient house recoups any additional premium in sales 
prices, the mortgage underwriting process does not account 
for these savings, contributing to lower adoption rates of 
energy-efficient measures. In this study, we focus on other 
reasons why the mortgage underwriting process should 
account for energy efficiency.
In their study of California homes, Kok and Kahn 
(2012) find that there is an average premium of $34, 800 
(~9%) for green-rated homes. Green-rated homes, such as 
those certified by Leadership in Energy and Environmental 
Design (LEED) or GreenPoint Rated, conserve energy 
and materials both in the operation and the construction 
phases. Presumably, these premiums are paid back through 
the operational savings over a lifetime. However, as Jaffe 
and Stavins (1994) argue, the non-rapid adoption of energy 
efficiency measures indicates that the present valuation of 
savings is less important to consumers than other market 
and non-market barriers.  These include transaction 
costs, uncertainty and cost of the initial investment, and 
information asymmetries, all of which are still poorly 
understood.  
With regard to energy efficiency and mortgage 
risks, the paucity of information is surprising because 
the potential relationship between the two can be easily 
explained. Burt, Goldstein, and Leeds (2010) theorize 
that mortgages on energy-efficient houses should have 
lower risks than those on standard houses because the 
savings from residential energy and transportation costs 
leave more income available in case of emergencies or 
unexpected events. Using proxy measures for transportation 
energy costs such as Walk Score™,  Rauterkus, Thrall, and 
Hangen (2010) find that transportation energy savings 
are associated with lower mortgage delinquency risks in 
high-income areas but higher risks in low-income areas. 
Increased vehicle ownership for households, as a proxy for 
higher transportation costs, increases the delinquency risks. 
These results contradict the earlier study by Blackman 
and Krupnick (2001),  who find that location efficient 
mortgages do not have any significant effect on delinquency 
risk compared to conventional mortgages.1 Empirical 
studies on this and related issues have reached suggestive, 
inconclusive, and even contradictory findings in large part 
due to the reliance on proxy measures to capture important 
variables.
In this study, we address some of the limitations of prior 
work and examine whether residential energy efficiency is 
associated with lower mortgage risks. More narrowly, we use 
a national sample of 71,000 loans from CoreLogic (38 states 
and the District of Columbia) and examine whether energy 
efficiency and the degree of energy efficiency are associated 
with lower default and prepayment risks. In this particular 
study, we focus on household energy consumption, leaving 
the effect of transportation energy burden for future work.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We first describe 
the different financing mechanisms for residential energy 
efficiency. Next, we provide an overview of the mortgage 
risk literature. Then, we describe the research design and 
1 This study is limited to Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loans in 
Chicago, Ill. Because the mandate of FHA is to increase home ownership among 
poor people, the results from this study may not be generalizable.
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methods to examine the effects of energy efficiency on 
mortgage risks.  Finally, we discuss the results and derive 
implications for future research and policy. 
Household Energy Efficiency
According to the Energy Information Administration’s 
2009 Residential Energy Consumption Survey (RECS), 
households spend around $230 billion each year on 
energy (not including transportation). The residential 
sector accounts for 20% of the total energy consumed in 
the United States (Energy Information Administration 
2011).  A widely cited study by McKinsey & Company 
suggests that energy efficiency in the residential sector has a 
potential to save $41 billion annually (Granade et al. 2009). 
It is, thus, not a surprise that building energy efficiency is 
considered the “fifth fuel” and is actively promoted through 
government policy and voluntary action.
One of the widespread ways of promoting residential 
energy efficiency in the United States is the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) ENERGY 
STAR program for appliances, commercial and industrial 
buildings, and new home construction. The market 
penetration of the ENERGY STAR label in new housing 
construction is noteworthy—25% of new U.S. housing 
starts were ENERGY STAR-certified in 2011.2 Homes 
awarded the ENERGY STAR label are at least 15%-20% 
more energy efficient than the typical new home and must 
meet rigorous guidelines for a high-efficiency thermal 
enclosure (windows, insulation etc.), Heating Ventilation and 
Air Conditioning (HVAC) system, and appliances, as well as 
a comprehensive water management system. 
To earn an ENERGY STAR rating, homes must 
undergo an inspection by a certified home energy rater 
who examines construction plans and conducts post-
construction evaluations, including a blower door test 
(to test the envelope infiltration) and a duct infiltration 
test. The rater uses this data to assign the home a relative 
performance score, called a HERS Index Score. The index 
is normalized to the climatic zone, size, and type of the 
house. A home built to current market standard (2006 
International Energy Conservation Code standard) is given 
a rating of 100.3 Lower HERS ratings for a house indicate 
2 http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=qhmi.
showHomesMarketIndex (Accessed February 5, 2013)
3 Fairey et al. (2000) provides a historical overview of the development of HERS 
ratings in the United States.
higher efficiency; i.e., a HERS rating of 60 means that 
the house is 40% more energy efficient than a similar one 
that is constructed to the current market standards. A score 
of 0 corresponds to a net-zero energy home. A standard 
resale house has a rating of 130. Typically, a HERS rating 
of 85 is required to achieve ENERGY STAR certification. 
Residential Energy Services Network (RESNET) is a 
standard-making body that certifies the raters as well as the 
procedures and is responsible for ensuring consistency and 
quality in certification.
Within the United States, there are other 
comprehensive, but smaller or regional, programs that 
promote energy efficiency in new housing construction, 
such as LEED for Homes, the National Association of 
Home Builders’ Green Building Standard, EarthCraft 
(in the Southeast), Earth Advantage Label (in the Pacific 
Northwest), and GreenPoint Rated certification (in 
California).4  These rating systems generally exceed the 
building performance of ENERGY STAR and promote 
comprehensive green building technologies and materials. 
Almost all rating systems rely on some version 
of modeled and hypothetical energy use. While the 
construction is tested for leakage and other inefficiencies, 
the rating systems do not account for actual post-
occupancy energy use.5 Household energy consumption, 
while dependent on building envelope and appliances, 
is also crucially dependent on occupants’ behavior and 
use patterns. As Stein and Myer (2000) point out, while 
ENERGY STAR certification is a useful predictor of a 
home’s relative energy efficiency, the difference between a 
homeowner’s expected/modeled and realized energy savings 
may vary. This consideration plays an important role in 
qualifying the conclusions drawn in this study. Nevertheless, 
ENERGY STAR-certified houses are, on average, expected 
to save energy compared to conventional homes.
Financing Energy Efficiency in the Residential 
Sector 
Promoting energy efficiency in the residential sector 
4 By 2012, only about 15,000 U.S. homes were LEED certified. On average, 
about 400,000 new homes are constructed every year in the United States. (See 
http://www.usgbc.org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentID=2683, http://www.census.
gov/construction/nrc/)
5 This is true for the residential sector. ENERGY STAR ratings for the non-
residential sector rely on building performance by comparing the actual energy use 
to other buildings of similar type in that year.
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requires providing mechanisms to offset the higher upfront 
cost generally associated with energy efficiency measures. 
While many of these measures have a reasonable payback 
period, some barriers, such as transaction costs and 
information asymmetries, prevent rapid and widespread 
adoption of energy efficiency (Gillingham, Newell, and 
Palmer 2009).  Part of the challenge for both public- and 
private-sector programs is to provide mechanisms, including 
innovative financing mechanisms, that will overcome these 
barriers.  The value of the U.S. housing stock is about $14.5 
trillion.6 If we assume that 2% of this value is required for 
efficiency improvement in the residential sector, public and 
private outlays add up to $300 billion. 
One of the ways in which energy efficiency is 
financed is through grants geared towards energy efficiency 
retrofits. A well-known and long running program is the 
Weatherization Assistance Program (WAP) that offers 
grants to qualified low-income families for the purpose 
of weatherization.  State-sponsored energy efficiency 
loan funds are also in vogue. They, too, have grown 
recently through funding from the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009. The National 
Association of State Energy Officials (NASEO) tracks 66 
such funds that are available in 34 states. The total amount 
of funding dedicated to state energy revolving loan funds 
covered in their database is over $925 million.7 
However, residential energy efficiency is predominantly 
funded by the rate payer. Total spending on U.S. rate-payer-
funded energy efficiency initiatives more than doubled 
in the latter half of the past decade—from $2 billion in 
2006 to $4.8 billion in 2010. However, two-thirds of the 
total was concentrated in only 10 states, with California, 
New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Washington as 
leaders (Barbose, Goldman, Hoffman, and Billingsley 2013; 
Barbose, Goldman, and Schlegel 2009). One such initiative, 
“on-bill financing” (OBF) is provided by the utilities as 
part of their efficiency efforts. Utilities provide zero- (or 
near-zero) interest loans for qualified customers, which 
are then recouped through a line item in the utility bill.  
However, most of these programs are targeted primarily at 
non-residential customers rather than homeowners due to 
the complexity of collection and resistance on the part of 
utilities (Fuller 2009). In 2011, New York State authorized 
6 Replacement cost value of U.S. housing stock:  Federal Reserve Board’s Flow 
of Funds Accounts, December 6, 2012, Table B.100 (line #43). This figure includes 
homes with and without underlying mortgages.
7 http://www.naseo.org/resources/selfs/ (Accessed February 7, 2013)
residential on-bill loans, which are currently being 
implemented by the New York State Energy Research 
Authority (NYSERDA) in cooperation with New York 
utilities (Henderson 2012).
Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) bonds are a 
financing mechanism that uses locally issued tax bonds to 
fund residential energy improvement activities. The funds 
are paid back gradually (over 20 years or so) through special 
taxation placed on the property through a lien. In the event 
of resale, new property owners take on the responsibility 
of special taxes. Because of the first lien placed on the 
property, secondary market institutions have been reluctant 
to embrace mechanisms such as PACE bonds, thus limiting 
their widespread adoption to date.    
By far, the most widely used mechanism is direct 
borrowing.  Most energy improvements for existing 
homes can be financed through consumer loans, a home 
equity loan secured by property, or by traditional or 
specialized mortgages. Although not widely available, energy 
improvement mortgages (EIM) allow the homeowner to 
fold the costs of energy improvements into the mortgage. 
By contrast, energy-efficient mortgages (EEM) allow 
lenders to have flexibility in the debt-to-income ratio and 
other underwriting considerations so that borrowers can 
qualify for larger loans or obtain a lower interest rate. Both 
these specialized programs are relatively small because of the 
transactional complexity and lack of information (USEPA 
2010). Furthermore, very few lenders currently offer them, 
except for Federal Housing Administration and Veterans 
Administration mortgages. For example, there are only 
three such lenders for the state of Texas and two in Arizona, 
the two states with the largest number of new ENERGY 
STAR residences in 2011.8 
The above programs and financing options have grown 
and show promise, but at less than $6 billion in aggregate 
are far below the need.  Of all these mechanisms, EEMs 
and EIMs have the greatest potential to encourage energy 
efficiency because they rely on the mainstream financial 
system.  Their limited availability and appeal may be due 
in large part to the uncertainty and lack of information 
about their inherent risks.  If, indeed, mortgages on energy-
efficient homes have lower risks than those on less-efficient 
homes, a lower pricing or more flexible underwriting 
8 http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=new_homes_partners.
locator (Accessed January 13, 2012).
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standard is likely to result in an increased demand for these 
products.  In addition, with more accurate information 
on risks, lenders may be able to develop and tailor these 
mortgage products more effectively.  
Estimating Mortgage Default and Prepayment Risks 
Mortgage lending, then, can play an important role 
in promoting energy efficiency. For this reason, it is 
important to understand the risks inherent in such lending. 
Fortunately, many insights have been gained from a large 
number of mortgage termination studies that can be applied 
to better understand the relationship between energy 
efficiency and risks. Previous studies focus on two aspects 
of mortgage risks: default and prepayment. Mortgage 
default occurs when mortgage borrowers stop making 
scheduled payment and certain conditions required by law 
occur.9  Prepayment occurs when borrowers pay off loans 
prematurely. From a lender perspective, prepayment can be 
considered a risk because when borrowers pay off the loan 
prematurely, often when interest rates fall, the expected 
stream of payment and return are not realized. Both default 
and prepayment can lead to a loss to lenders, although given 
the relative size of the loss, researchers and practitioners tend 
to focus more on default (Quercia and Stegman 1992).
Two complementary frameworks have been advanced 
to explain these two risks. One has focused on the financial 
benefit of options (Foster and Van Order 1984; Kau, Keenan, 
Muller, and Epperson 1992). This group of studies treats 
default and prepayment as financial options. The framework 
assumes that borrowers make constant evaluations about 
the financial benefits of these options and will exercise 
them once those options become beneficial. For instance, 
with regard to default, borrowers are expected to consider 
their equity position: borrowers who owe to the lender 
more than the house is worth, net of costs, are expected to 
be more likely to default than those with positive equity 
positions. This explanation, though powerful in explaining 
certain key aspects of mortgage performance, does not seem 
to explain fully why borrowers stop making their mortgage 
payments. Over the last two decades, a complementary view 
has emerged in which most borrowers are said to evaluate 
their equity position (or option) only in the event of a crisis 
or trigger event, such as job loss or divorce (Vandell 1995). 
Most recent studies of default use a combination of these 
9 In the United States, laws governing the conditions of default and foreclosure 
can differ by jurisdictions (See e.g. Cutts & Merrill, 2008).
frameworks. 
Empirically, researchers have found evidence 
supporting the complementary views of the option-based 
and adverse trigger-event frameworks. The loan-to-value 
ratio, the value of the prepayment option, and the local 
unemployment rates have been found to have consistent 
impacts on both mortgage default and prepayment. Also, 
certain characteristics of the borrower and the financial and 
servicing institutions have a consistent effect. For instance, 
Quercia, Pennington-Cross, and Tian (2012) find support 
for the importance of current loan-to-value ratio, borrower 
credit, income, and unemployment. As a rule, ability to 
pay (captured by debt-to-income ratio) has been omitted 
from most loan termination studies due to methodological 
considerations.10  Consistent with prior work, we use three 
months late in payments (90 days delinquency) to model 
the default decision. 
The savings resulting from energy efficiency, as 
discussed previously, can be viewed as a cushion to 
unanticipated crisis or adverse events that could make 
mortgage repayment more difficult.  It is also likely that 
homeowners in the market for efficient homes weigh the 
long-term savings derived from energy efficiency against 
the short-term higher costs, thus reflecting a higher degree 
of financial savvy.  On the basis of the mortgage termination 
literature, we expect mortgages on energy-efficient homes 
to have a lower probability of default than those on less 
efficient ones.
Research Design and Methods
Researchers often apply hazard analysis in mortgage 
evaluation to deal with the right censoring issue or the fact 
that borrowers may terminate their mortgage after the 
period under consideration.  In such an analysis, researchers 
estimate the conditional event probability (hazard), i.e., the 
probabilities of default and prepayment, conditional on 
surviving to date, as defined statistically.  Default and 
prepayment are considered competing risks because when 
borrowers act on one they preclude action on the other.  In 
the context of this competing risk model, consider two 
termination risks: default (D) and prepay (P). The hazard   
for an individual i, risk r =D,P given 
characteristics , parameters, , and unobserved 
10 Two exceptions include Quercia, Pennington-Cross, and Tian (2012) and 
Berkovec et al. (1998).
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where Pr is the probability, E is a set of variables of the 
house that relate to energy consumption (such as square feet 
and climate) and X is the standard set of explanatory 
variables from the mortgage termination literature (such as 
LTV, unemployment rate, age of the loan indicator variables, 
etc.). C is an indicator variable referring to the treatment 
(ENERGY STAR/regular). are the estimates of interest.
In order to understand whether the extent of energy 
efficiency matters, we compare the risks of default of 
mortgages on ENERGY STAR homes for which a HERS 
Index Score is available. These HERS ratings are included 
in the model as a continuous variable (0-85), thus allowing 
us to examine whether better energy efficiency (lower 
HERS rating) is associated with lower mortgage risks.  
Thus, instead of an indicator variable for treatment we use a 
HERS rating variable. Because the HERS model primarily 
compares the loan performance of ENERGY STAR 
residences, the results may be interpreted as an argument for 
considering the degree of energy efficiency in the mortgage 
underwriting process. 
heterogeneity parameter is defined as
With a discrete time assumption, a multinomial logit 
model is often used to estimate the above equation. 
We use a treatment control research design to estimate 
the differences in mortgage termination risks.  We use 
the loan information for ENERGY STAR (treatment) 
and non-ENERGY STAR (control), supplemented with 
information about factors that contribute to household 
energy consumption. We adopt the competing risk 
framework of mortgage terminations and estimate the 
impact of prepayment and mortgage default simultaneously  
(Quercia and Spader 2008).  A multinomial logit model 
is used to quantify these risks relative to one another and  
tests whether risks of loans of energy-efficient homes are 
different from those of energy-inefficient homes:
Figure 1: Geographical Distribution of the Sample (ENERGY STAR and Non-ENERGY STAR Residences)
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Data Description 
The study uses a carefully constructed sample of loans 
across the nation. First, we obtained addresses of 226,962 
HERS-rated homes from RESNET’s database and directly 
from individual HERS providers. These houses obtained 
a HERS rating from 2000-2010. Because of data privacy 
restrictions,11 inconsistent addresses, and low numbers 
market share of HERS-rated homes, the states of Alaska, 
Arizona, California, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, North 
Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, West Virginia, 
and Wyoming are excluded from the sample (Figure 1). 
Each of the addresses is matched to addresses in 
CoreLogic’s loan level database. For each of these 
matched records within the zip code, loan information of 
approximately three other loan records was also included 
in the sample. It is assumed that these houses are not 
energy efficient and are considered part of the “control” 
group.  Furthermore, the sample is restricted to single-
family owner-occupied houses whose loans originated from 
January 2002 and loans that were used for purchase only. 
All the loan level variables including payment stream 
were provided by CoreLogic. Prepayment is defined as 
loans being paid off prematurely. Consistent with prior 
11 While energy-efficient homes enjoy a large market share in California, 
consumer privacy restrictions prevented the access to address and rating data for 
California HERS-rated homes.
work, 90 days delinquency is used to capture mortgage 
default. Similarly, the key risk determinants at origination 
are included in the model: borrower credit score (FICO), 
loan-to-value ratio, loan type (conventional/government 
and non-profit organizations backed), local unemployment 
rate, neighborhood income, house value relative to the area 
median value, debt-to-income ratio, size of the house, and 
age of the house (Table 1). 
We constructed the neighborhood level variables from 
multiple sources. CoreLogic’s MarketTrends database was 
used to include variables such as the number of foreclosures 
and the number of properties own by lenders (REOs) in 
the area. Unemployment rate, median housing value, and 
household income were retrieved from the 2006-2010 
Census American Community Survey at the census-tract 
level. Geographic weighting was used to aggregate the data 
to the zip-code level. 
In addition to the ENERGY STAR and HERS 
rating, we included a number of other energy-use-related 
variables in the analysis, including the number of cooling 
days, number of heating days, electricity prices, and area 
of the house. Weather data, such as average annual (over 
the last decade) cooling degree days and heating degree 
days, are obtained from the National Climatic Data Center. 
Each weather station is assigned to a block group and then 
data were aggregated to zip-code level through geographic 
weighting.  Electricity prices are used as a proxy for cost 
Variables Non-ENERGY STAR Homes ENERGY STAR Homes
n 46,118 24,944
Age of House 13.2 4.2
Area (sq.ft.)  2,183 2,283
Origination LTV 0.91 0.93
FICO Score 706.1 705.3
Zip Code Average Income  $73,741  $73,550 
Zip Code Unemployment 6.4 6.4
Time to Default 30.6 29.9
Sale Price  $218,461 $ 221,919 
Cooling Degree Days 1,486 1,494
Heating Degree Days 1,308 1,199
Electricity Price  (¢/kWh) 12.2 12.1
Table 1: Average Values for ENERGY STAR and Non-ENERGY STAR Homes in the National Sample
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of energy.  Prices at the zip-code level are obtained from 
Open Energy Info12 and compiled by NREL and Ventyx 
for both investor-owned utilities (IOU) and non-IOU 
utilities. Approximately 1,300 zip codes were without data. 
They were estimated from neighboring zip codes and 
through manual lookup. These zip-code level neighborhood 
variables were then added to the address-level loan 
information. The addresses were then de-identified and the 
analysis conducted on this dataset. 
Overall, the final analysis file for the baseline model 
includes information on about 71,000 loans. This number 
results from limiting the sample to 30-year fixed-rate 
mortgages,13 the first five years after origination, loans with 
original loan-to-value ratios between 50% and 150%, and 
excluding cases with missing values in key determinants. All 
71,000 loans are included in our baseline model estimation. 
Only the ENERGY STAR homes (~35% or 21,000) 
are included in the model that examines the relationship 
between the extent of energy efficiency and mortgage 
termination risks. 
Descriptively, ENERGY STAR homes show lower 
incidences of default and prepayment.  About 23% of the 
ENERGY STAR home loans prepaid compared with 
12 http://en.openei.org/wiki/Gateway:Utilities (Accessed September 2012).
13 Adjustable-rate mortgages (ARM) and other types of loans require  panel data 
that tracks the payment schedule and time-arying attributes. Such data are not 
available and the models used in the study are not suitable to study such mortgages, 
but should be considered in future work.
33% for the non-ENERGY STAR group. Similarly, 
while mortgages on only 8% of ENERGY STAR homes 
have experienced default (on average after 29.9 months), 
about 15% of mortgages on the non-ENERGY STAR 
homes group did (on average, after 30.8 months). Other 
notable differences include the fact that ENERGY STAR 
houses are newer than other homes and, while the average 
ENERGY STAR house is larger, the price per square foot 
is remarkably similar between the two groups (~$106/sq. 
ft.). As for the rest of the key variables, both treatments and 
control groups have similar characteristics.14  
Energy Efficiency Associated with Lower Mortgage 
Risks 
Overall, the findings are consistent with prior work and 
expectations (Table 2). 
In the baseline model, we examine the relationship 
between ENERGY STAR rating and the mortgage 
risks (Table 3), i.e., when C is the indicator variable 
that represents whether a home has ENERGY STAR 
certification. To further examine, the effect of relative 
efficiency on mortgage risks, we examine the subsample 
of ENERGY STAR-certified houses for which we have a 
HERS rating (Table 4). In addition to the variables included 
14 To account for the distributional differences in age, we also restricted the 
sample to houses that were built in the last decade. The findings are similar in 
direction and significance as those presented here.  Refer to the Appendix for 
findings when restricting the sample to post-2000 homes (Table 3B).
BASELINE MODEL HERS RATING SAMPLE
Default Prepayment Default Prepayment
ENERGY STAR Certification -- -- N/A N/A
HERS Rating N/A N/A ++ ++
FICO Score -- ++ -- ++
Origination Loan-to-Value Ratio ++ -- + --
Age of the House -- -- - --
Loan Type ++ ++ ++ ++
Neighborhood Unemployment Rate ++ -- + --
Neighborhood Income ++ ++ ++ +
House Value/ Area Median Sale Price -- ++ -- +
Note: ++, -- represent statistically significant results and +, - represent insignificant results.
Table 2: Summary of Findings
UNC Center for Community Capital • Institute for Market Transformation | March 2013
Home Energy Efficiency and Mortgage Risks • 10
in the baseline model, the HERS model incorporates 
additional variables that capture local energy use 
characteristics. These include cooling degree days, heating 
degree days, electricity price and area of the house.
ENERGY STAR certification is associated with 
substantial and significant reduction in the default and 
prepayment risks (Table 4). The odds of a mortgage default 
on an ENERGY STAR residence, ceteris paribus, are one-
third less than those on a home in the control group. A 
mortgage on an ENERGY STAR residence is also one-
fourth less likely to be prepaid. With regard to whether 
the extent of energy efficiency matters (HERS rating), 
the findings are consistent with expectations (Table 4). 
Controlling for other factors, more efficiency, measured 
by a point decrease in the HERS score, is associated with 
a decrease in the risk of default by 4% and in that of 
prepayment by 2%. This suggests that mortgages on more 
efficient homes exhibit even lower mortgage risks than 
those on their less-efficient but still ENERGY STAR-rated 
counterparts.
As a rule, the other predictors in both models exhibit 
the expected effects. Borrower credit score (FICO) is 
significantly and positively associated with prepayment 
and negatively associated with default in both the baseline 
and HERS models. Original loan-to-value (OLTV) 
ratio exhibits significant and positive effects on default 
and negative effects on prepayment. Controlling for the 
state-fixed effects, the effect of OLTV is insignificant in 
the HERS model for default, though increasing OLTV 
reduces the prepayment risk.  In this dataset, conventional 
loans have higher default and prepayment risks compared 
to government-backed (include Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac) and nonprofit loans, probably because the loans 
tend to carry more favorable terms and servicing. Local 
unemployment rates are positively associated with default 
risks in the baseline model and negatively associated 
with prepayment risks in both models. While higher 
neighborhood incomes increase the default and prepayment 
rates, the effects are substantively small.  This result is likely 
due to the coarseness of the neighborhood that evens out 
any spillover effects.  Older houses are both less likely to 
default and prepay. Finally, houses with values higher than 
the neighborhood mean exhibit lower default and higher 
prepayment propensities, reflecting the underlying income 
effect.
Table 3: Base Model (All Data)
DEFAULT PREPAY
Variable Estimate Std. Err. Sig
Odds
Ratio Estimate Std. Err. Sig
Odds
Ratio
Intercept 8.91 0.37 *** 1.94 0.26 ***
FICO Score -0.01 0.00 *** 0.99 0.00 0.00 *** 1.00
Loan Origination After 2006 -2.92 0.05 *** 0.05 -3.03 0.04 *** 0.05
Original Loan to Value Ratio 0.79 0.17 *** 2.20 -1.51 0.12 *** 0.22
Loan Type 1.31 0.04 *** 3.72 0.33 0.03 *** 1.39
Zip Code Average 
Unemployment
0.03 0.01 *** 1.03 -0.04 0.00 *** 0.96
Zip Code Average Income 0.00 0.00 *** 1.00 0.00 0.00 *** 1.00
House Price Relative to Zip 
Code Sale Price
-0.13 0.03 *** 0.87 0.16 0.02 *** 1.18
Age of the House -0.01 0.00 *** 0.99 -0.01 0.00 *** 0.99
ENERGY STAR 
Certification
-0.39 0.03 *** 0.68 -0.32 0.02 *** 0.73
n=71,062. Log likelihood=-52,007.6
*** p <= 0.001, ** p <= 0.01, * p <= 0.05, . p <= 0.1
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Energy prices do not seem to have an effect on the 
default likelihood but do negatively affect prepayment 
risks within ENERGY STAR homes (Table 4), i.e., higher 
energy costs reduce the risk of prepayment.  Controlling 
for the relative price of the house, larger houses have higher 
prepayment and default risks.  Age of the loan is included as 
a set of dummies in the models. The higher the age of the 
loan, the more likely the risk of default.  Dummies for the 
state are also used in the models to control for the state-
fixed effects, and are almost all statistically insignificant in 
the baseline models.15   These model results are qualitatively 
consistent with other specifications and hence the results are 
robust.
15 They are not presented in the tables for brevity.  A complete set of results is 
available from the authors.
Implications for Public Policy and Research
As the Great Recession has made painfully obvious, the 
mispricing of mortgage risks can have serious implications.  
Similarly, the mispricing of risks can have serious negative 
implications in the recovery.  Efficiency will be hurt when 
credit decisions do not take into consideration important 
risk information.  The models suggest that mortgages on 
energy-efficient housing loans have significantly lower 
risks than those on less efficient homes, yet mortgage 
underwriting practices do not reflect this fact.   We find that 
mortgages on energy-efficient homes are associated with 
lower mortgage risks. Default risks on these mortgages are 
about one-third lower than those in the control group.  We 
also find that the extent of energy efficiency matters:  the 
more energy efficiency, the lower the risks. 
Table 4: HERS Model (Only with ENERGY STAR Homes)
DEFAULT PREPAY
Variable Estimate
Std. 
Err. Sig
Odds
Ratio Estimate Std. Err. Sig
Odds
Ratio
Intercept 10.25 1.19 *** -0.49 0.74
FICO Score -0.02 0.00 *** 0.98 0.00 0.00 *** 1.00
Loan Origination After 
2006
-3.76 0.18 *** 0.02 -2.29 0.15 *** 0.10
Original Loan-to-Value 
Ratio
0.30 0.44 1.35 -1.19 0.25 *** 0.30
Loan Type 0.58 0.09 *** 1.78 0.22 0.06 *** 1.24
Zip Code Average 
Unemployment
0.02 0.01 1.02 -0.05 0.01 *** 0.95
Zip Code Average 
Income
0.00 0.00 *** 1.00 0.00 0.00 . 1.00
House Price Relative 
to Zip Code Sale Price
-0.18 0.08 * 0.83 0.10 0.04 * 1.11
Cooling Degree Days 0.00 0.02 1.00 -0.07 0.01 *** 0.93
Heating Degree Days -0.04 0.02 * 0.96 0.00 0.01 1.00
Electricity Price 0.01 0.01 1.01 -0.02 0.01 *** 0.98
Area of the House 0.01 0.00 * 1.01 0.02 0.00 *** 1.02
Age of the House -0.01 0.02 0.99 -0.07 0.01 *** 0.94
HERS Score 0.04 0.01 *** 1.04 0.02 0.00 *** 1.02
n=21,094, Log likelihood=-12,822.26
*** p <= 0.001, ** p <= 0.01, * p <= 0.05, . p <= 0.1
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Because the findings are consistent among different 
model specifications and different types of subsamples, we 
can derive a number of implications for policy and lending 
practices. First, lenders may want to require an energy 
audit or energy rating during the process of mortgage 
underwriting.  In the same manner that appraisals calculate 
the value of the home, an energy-rating determination 
could define other important characteristics of the loan, 
including the debt-to-income ratio.  Requiring energy 
audits as part of the mortgage underwriting process 
would help homeowners make informed decisions about 
energy efficiency investments and likely promote long-
term efficiency of the house rather than a single-time 
certification. This alone is likely to increase the energy 
performance of housing stock.
Second, lenders and secondary market investors should 
take into account the energy efficiency of the home used 
as collateral for the loan in the underwriting decisions.  
For instance, they may allow for a higher debt-to-income 
ratio, lower FICO score, or a reduction in the interest rate.  
Relaxing the residual income standards for some types of 
mortgages that will account for the degree of efficiency of 
the house may be another option. Any of these approaches 
would allow borrowers to obtain larger loans. This would 
increase affordability for many borrowers, especially in 
high-cost areas. Loan-level price adjustments (LLPAs) could 
also be used to account for mortgages on energy-efficient 
homes. Moreover, when possible, lenders should consider a 
HERS or similar rating that accounts for degrees of energy 
efficiency in a unit as well. 
According to a study by the Joint Center for Housing 
Studies at Harvard University, two-fifths of home 
remodeling spending is for building envelope replacements 
and system upgrades (including electrical and HVAC 
systems).16   Given that this was a $275 billion market in 
2011, this represents about $100 billion investment by  
consumers that can be geared towards energy efficiency. 
One of the ways to promote these energy efficiency 
investments is to consider the underwriting rules for the 
home improvement loans by factoring in the decreased risk 
associated with energy-efficient homes.  Another is to find 
mechanisms to encourage time-of-sale improvements on 
energy-efficiency measures. In particular, this is likely to 
help lower-income borrowers, who tend to purchase older 
16 http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/harvard_jchs_
remodeling_report_2013.pdf (Accessed February 20, 2013)
homes that are often less energy efficient than those built 
in more recent years.  The U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency should encourage more lenders to join the 
ENERGY STAR program to broaden the consideration 
of energy efficiency in mortgage underwriting.  The low 
numbers of lenders associated with the ENERGY STAR 
program should be addressed.
One of the criticisms of the ENERGY STAR 
program17 in the green building community is that the 
standards of the program are too low to merit incentives 
(Hassel, Blasnick, and Hannas, 2009). One possible way 
of promoting energy efficiency is to move towards 
performance-based metrics rather than design-based 
certifications. Most of the narrowing gap between the 
utility savings of ENERGY STAR and those without 
that rating can be attributed to overall energy efficiency 
improvements in more recently built housing. While this 
study does not directly use the realized energy savings in 
mortgage performance, other studies show that standards 
for ENERGY STAR could be tightened, including moving 
towards more performance-based approaches. Future studies 
could examine this more thoroughly.
Future work needs to address a number of issues 
associated with this research. It needs to address the so-
called endogeneity issue common in most mortgage 
performance studies. Mortgage borrowers who reside in 
energy-efficient homes may simply be more financially 
able than those who own less efficient homes. Panel data 
that tracks the borrower’s income and market conditions 
is not available that will allow us to tease these effects. 
Future research also needs to examine additional measures 
of energy efficiency.  While HERS can predict average 
energy costs in general, individual ratings, especially for 
older houses, are largely uncorrelated with the energy 
costs (Stein and Meier 2000).  Therefore, better measures 
of energy savings could be considered in future studies to 
capture more fully its impact on mortgage risks. Future 
research should use a broader sample to study the effect 
on risk. Furthermore, other rating systems that promote 
more comprehensive green building strategies could also 
be examined for their effect on mortgage risk. However, 
overall, we believe the findings in this paper are robust and 
consistent enough across different model specifications to 
warrant further examination.  
17 A recent General Accounting Office report found that the ENERGY STAR 
certification process for products can also be strengthened (USGAO 2010).
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In general, the findings suggest that energy efficiency 
and the degree of energy efficiency matter. By reducing the 
household energy burden, the models suggest that owners 
of efficient homes are more likely to continue to meet 
their mortgage obligations. The lower risks associated with 
energy efficiency should be taken into consideration when 
underwriting mortgage risks.  As such, Congress should 
consider the findings in their deliberations of the SAVE 
Act, the bill proposed to improve the accuracy of mortgage 
underwriting used by federal mortgage agencies by 
ensuring that energy costs are included in the underwriting 
process. Similarly, market stakeholders, such as Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, could encourage underwriting 
flexibility for mortgages on energy-efficient homes, for 
instance by adjusting LLPAs or their equivalents accordingly. 
These measures have potential to dramatically increase the 
adoption of efficiency, contribute to reduction of the energy 
burden, and increase the quality of life for households across 
the United States.
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Appendix
Table 3B: Base Model (Houses Built after 2000)
DEFAULT PREPAY
Variable Estimate Std. Err. Sig
Odds
Ratio Estimate Std. Err. Sig
Odds
Ratio
Intercept 11.32 0.45 *** 3.21 0.32 ***
FICO Score -0.01 0.00 *** 0.99 0.00 0.00 *** 1.00
Loan Origination After 
2006
-2.96 0.06 *** 0.05 -3.06 0.06 *** 0.05
Original Loan to Value 
Ratio
0.29 0.20 1.34 -1.72 0.14 *** 0.18
Loan Type 1.25 0.04 *** 3.48 0.23 0.03 *** 1.26
Zip Code Average 
Unemployment
0.02 0.01 *** 1.02 -0.05 0.01 *** 0.95
Zip Code Average Income 0.00 0.00 *** 1.00 0.00 0.00 *** 1.00
House Price Relative to 
Zip Code Sale Price
-0.26 0.04 *** 0.77 0.15 0.02 *** 1.16
Age of the House -0.24 0.01 *** 0.79 -0.16 0.01 *** 0.85
ENERGY STAR 
Certification
-0.65 0.03 *** 0.52 -0.52 0.03 *** 0.60
n=56,787. Log likelihood=-40,447.8
*** p <= 0.001, ** p <= 0.01, * p <= 0.05, . p <= 0.1
Table 1B: Average Values for ENERGY STAR and Non-ENERGY STAR Homes for Houses Built after 2000
Variables Non ENERGY STAR Homes ENERGY STAR Homes
n 33,001 24,915
Age of House 5.8 4.1
Area (sq.ft.)  2,311 2,283
Original Loan to Value Ratio 0.91 0.93
FICO Score 706 705.3
Zip Code Average Income  $ 74,181  $ 73,550 
Zip Code Unemployment 6.53 6.35
Time to Default 30.8 29.9
Sale Price $ 226,708 $ 221,699
Cooling Degree Days 1,573 1,494
Heating Degree Days 1,184 1,198
Electricity Price 12.2 12.1
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